Second, there is considerable debate on the abundance of energy resources and how long they are likely to last. I scanned the literature and discovered that the estimates of resource availabil ity vari ed by greater than a factor of 25. At the lower end of this estimate, the earth (and particularly the indus~ tria 1 i zed nations) wi 11 suffer terri b 1 e economi c consequences within a decade~ They are doing little about finding alternate energy sources, so I conclude that their leaders are not particularly worried about the scarcity of economic energy resources. There does exist a fringe group that speaks of the IIlimits of growth ll and there are people who speak of IIsoft paths ll and decentralized renewable energy systems and energy conservation~ These people make some interesting points, but they do not exert very much i nfl uence in high government ci rc 1 es.
Third, I have been baffled by the oil situation in the United States and other countries. The United States acts curiously when it is threatened. Recently, many of its citizens were prepared to go to war because 50 of its people were captured by students in a far away country. And yet, when the United States is really threatened, as they are by the price increases and uncertain .availability of world oil (controlled by an international oil cartel), they do very little. I have mentioned that an attempt is being made to prod~ce liquid fuels from coal at very high costs. Yet there are large quantities of garbage distributed throughout the country that people pay money to remove and dump, when it could be converted into scarce liquid fuels at a cost much lower than converting coal to liquid energy forms. But the garbage is dumped and the coal is dug up.
The problem of liquid fuels is apparently very serious. ~1any of their experts have predicted that there will be a severe oil shortage in less than ten years. These same experts have shown that a shortage of oil will cost the United States billions of dollars, will cause severe unemployment and have disastrous effects on the world economy. And some of the experts have shown ways that half of the oil imports could be conserved over the next ten years, at a cost of less than 60 cents per gallon of gasoline. What is the response? Mainly synthetic fuels at $2.00 per gallon or more, with little chance that it can be ready in significant supply short of twenty or thirty years. I do not ynderstand why these people and their leaders are willing to court economic ·disaster and social upheaval when they apparently value their economic goods, material possessions, and social institutions so much.
I could go on and on with the contradictions that I have found in the energy policies of the United States. But I think at this point you can agree with me that there is no rational basis for the energy policy actions of the leading world power. I remain most perplexed by the belief in economic rationality combined with the irrational behavior of the people in their energy decisions and policy. Please inform if you wish continuation of the investigation.
II. Discussion of Energy Issues 4
The report from our extragalactic visitor has raised many important issues. They have several common themes: as oil resources·are declining and severe shortages (caused by an inability of world productive capacity ~ to keep pace with growing demand) are expected within the decade, the United States continues to waste energy in large quantitites. Extreme anomalies are present in our energy system and in the processes by which 5 decisions are made about energy: we spend vast sums of money to expand energy supply, when there are much better investments that can be made to increase the effici~ncy of energy use. We are, in effect, wasting our most valuable resources (time, labor, materials~ and energy) in providing goods and services to our economy. This is, as our visitor has stated, an irrational way for us to proceed. We wish first to understand why this has come about in order to propose policy remedies for the problem.
A. Energy Decentralization, Values, Lifestyle, and Behavior
These issues lead directly to the theme of energy decentralization.
Indeed, we believe that the theme of energy decentralization is in many ways a unifying concept that will clarify many of the difficulties that our observer had in understanding the U.S. energy system. Devices that use energy are distributed throughout the society; they are totally decentralized. They are not nearly as efficient as they could be or ought to be, given the high value of energy. Decisions about energy-using equipment are not and, in our society, cannot be made centrally. They result from a vast array of individual choices made by every person and every organization in our economy. Thus, though the Department of Energy official who is designing a synthetic fuels program may be seen from one perspective as producing plans that are inconsistent with the efficient production, allocation, and use of energy resources, it ishis role as energy user that most forcefully points up the conflicts within our energy decision making process. He shares this role as an energy user with everyone else in the nation and, if he is typical, he is probably more irrational in his personal decisions about energy than he is in his professional decisions. Decentralization from this perspective begins with technology as a means of improving our efficiency as we go about our business. But it is intimately related to institutions, for the innumerable decisions on energy using systems are made at every level--by individuals, by businesses and industry, by banks and other lending institutions, and by government.
The primary challenge of implementing decentralization is that of changing the criteria by which the array of energy decisions are made.
The term decentralization has often been used to imply lifestyle changes. This is, in our judgment, a correct interpretation of the implications of energy decentralization. As the recognition of the scarcity and high value of energy spreads through society, people will learn to . adapt their lives to changing circumstances. An example of one possible adaptation has to do with the American love affair with the automobile.
Not too many years ago, a giant Cadillac was the ultimate symbol of success. The prestigous nature of this possession was enhanced if the owner replaced it every year with a new, and probably larger, model. No doubt these values continue in many parts of the country. But GM, our most profitable auto manufacturer, has recognized that a luxury car that appeals to the status seeking qualities of many Americans (especially Ameri can males) can be bui It sma 11, be made reasonably effi ci ent in its use of gasoline, and still provide its most important end product: status.
And, incidently, it can provide transportation as well. In time, owning a super efficient automobile could come to confer status on its owner; indeed, in many circles, the possession of a large, wasteful automobile is regarded as a display of poor judgment rather than success. As the critical threat of oil import cutoffs grows, the possession of a gasoline wasting automobile may generally be seen as unpatriotic and a social 7 incentive to purchase efficient cars may emerge.
In this paper we are concerned with the present and the immediate future; we do not expect lifestyle and value changes to playa large and immediate role in changing our energy use characteristics. However, as the stresses on the energy system grow, as the inconveniences of overconsumption of energy (e.g., long waits for gasoline) are increasingly suffered, as our ability to conduct foreign policy becomes restricted (already clearly recognized in our de~lings on the Middle East), and as uncertainty in energy price and availability increasingly interferes with countless business decisions, changes in values and lifestyles will of necessity take place. It is not a question of if these changes will occur; it is rather a question of when they will take place and if they will occur in time to. avoid an otherwise extremely painful set of events.
It is preferable that the adaptations occur'in time. to avoid great suffering and misery, especially since those least equipped to deal with economic adversity (generally the poor) are likely to bear the brunt of.the suffering. But we know little about the time constants associated with basic changes"in attitudes and behavior related to our use of energy.
We do, however, have considerable information about the technical and economic factors associated with improving the efficiency of energy use. And we have some knowledge about the decision making process that has di rected our patterns of energy use. We now attempt to put thi s information to use in an attempt to explain the phenomena that our extragalactic visitor found so "confusing" and so unyielding of "rational explanation." B. Understanding the "Irrationality" the Consumers Energy Decision . Maki ng One explanation for the seeming irrationality of our energy decisions is the low price of energy and its ample availability over the past decades.
With very low energy prices, the consumer had little incentive to invest the time and effort to obtain information to improve his decisions.
Furthermore, even though we are suddenly faced with rapid increases in energy prices, it takes time for people to change their habits and devote attention to learning about ways to reduce energy needs or obtain energy appropriate sources.
This explanation, while providing some answers to our dilemma, is not the entire story. We reach this conclusion by investigating behavior in For poor people during the early 1970's, the annual household energy bill is estimated to have been $280 (Newman and Wachtel, 1975) . Although a smaller expendit~re than that of ' wealthier households, the energy bill amounted to more than 10 percent of income for the lowest income groups. The lower income groups might therefore be expected to take the trouble to save $50 or $100 per year. However, there are two reasons why they did not do so: (1) most of the poor people do not own their own homes; they are therefore unlikely to invest in home improvements unless they are committed to remain in the same place for many years.
There is little incentive for 'the property owner to invest in energy conservation, because it is invisible and cannot easily justify an increase in rent. (2) For the low income families that own their own hom~s, the availability of ~apital is so limited and the cost so high that they are precluded from making significant investments in energy conservation, even if the investment is paid back in one or two years.
In short, the annual savings have historically either been 'so small (for the ~iddle economic classes and above) or so difficult to achieve because (Here, at an extra cost of $1000 for a very efficient diesel engine, 11 the effective cost of gasoline not purchased because of the energy conservation inve?tment is 60 cents per gallon.) New houses could be tightly caulked to reduce heat loss through air infiltration and equipped with a mechanical ventilation system (fan .and ducts) and a heat recuperator to recover heat. Such a house would use less than 60 percent of the energy used for space heating in a typical house. The energy conservation investment would be equivalent to paying 75 cents for each dollar of natural gas not used.)
These examples all have one thing in common: the energy efficient equipment that produces these large energy and dollar savings is not widely available in the market place. Thus, if a consumer wishes to purchase an extremely efficient refrigerator or house, he can only do so at enormous inconvenience to himself or not at all.
What is the cause of this 'deficiency in corisumer products in a land that has greatest variety of products (more than 100 brands of toothpaste!) known to man? We don't know the full answer, but it is some combination of 1 imited interest in energy conservation as a marketable commodity by manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and advertisers and little demand for energy conservation in consumer products by the purchasing public. While it is true that energy conservation has played a role in recent advertising, the claims of "energy efficiency" in most products (e.g., automobiles) are ludicrous when compared with the technical and economic opportunities for achieving high energy efficiency levels. The discussion thus far has addressed only part of "ihe issue raised by our extragalactic visitor who was baffled by the lack of economic rationality exhibited by the Americans who ostensibly believed in the economic efficiency'of the marketplace. It attempts to account for the under-investment in energy conservation by the final consumer of products.
But it does not explain why the energy industry is so eager to invest in large, centralized energy supply technologies when cheaper means are available to accomplish the same ends. We believe that this phenomenon is one of the fundamental but little recognized causes of our energy problems.
The decision maker on the new power plant costing $2 billion is the electric utility (and its regulators). This decision maker has choices to make among many different technologies but he considers only technologies that produce electricity. Although the electric utility's product is electricity, electricity is not what the consumer. really wishes to purchase. The end user wants services such as refrigeration, air conditioning, and lighting which can be obtained through the use of electricity. If another energy source were available to produce the same end services at half the cost and no added inconvenience, the consumer would surely be satisfied to convert to the use of this new fuel. Thus, the electric utitity is primarily concerned with the cost and convenience (i.e., reliability, availability) of producing and distributing electricity; the consumer is primarily concerne.d with the cost and convenience of final services (refrigeration, etc.). evaluates energy supply projects in relation to projects that produce the equivalent services but entail no investment in supply.
As a result of pursuing the centralized rather than the decentralized projects, a billion dollars is wasted (for one new power plant) and until very recently no one even noticed. Further, the additional energy produced detracts from rather than contributing to our lives, because no new services are provided, environmental degradation is increas~d, and resources that could h~ve been used productively are lost.
D. Recapitulation
We have attempted to explain the curious economic irrationality observed by our visitor as he analyzed the energy situation in the United
States. We have identified five factors, ~ach operating in different ways on different decision makers, and at (occasionally) times over the past ten years. These factors are:
1. Low unit price of energy (until mid-seventies) 2. Annual fuel bill a small percentage of disposable income.
Lack of consumer information about energy conservation
opportunities and lack of knowledge about how to evaluate investments.
4. The unavailability of efficient equipment in the marketplace.
5. The inability of energy supply firms to allocate their considerable resources to investments in energy conservation at the end use level.
The fifth factor, unlike the first four, accounts for the enormous investment in large, centralized energy supply projects. The first four factors are important in explaining the failure of decentralized energy projects to achieve anything near their potential during the past decade and before.
We now utilize this information to address energy policy issues confronting the Nation. We attempt to show how a strategy for enhancing the decentralized decision making process on energy can address the issue~ raised by the visitor and can be based on our understanding of the causes of the economic irrationality of the energy system.
III. Energy Policy Considerations

A. Higher Energy Prices and Energy Decentralization
We have noted that higher energy prices alone will not cure our energy problems. We also recognize that they will help begin the cure. *Pl-P4 demand determined by using total send out plus curtailment 1ess electric requirement less gas sent to storage. Source: utility estimates and historic data, California Gas
R~ports.
1976 electric demand determined from CEC Quarterly Fuels Report using natural gas and fuel oil use. tEC estimat~s from exhibits in PUC Case No. 10342. , heat pumps (a highly efficient way of providing space heat using electricity. with the industry experiencing very high growth rates during the past several years), solar heaters for swimming pools, and solar domestic water heaters. Other firms manufacturi.ng multiple glazings, heat recovery systems forresidential and commercial use, wind energy syste~s, co-generation facilities, and equipment for the direct burning of organic wastes are certain to see significant growth during the 1980's.
We believe that these activities are just a beginning. They provide a basis for some hope, but they offer little reason for complacency.
Energy demand has a curious way of finding new ways to grow and investment in conservation, ways to decline. Nonetheless, there are some reasons to believe that we have begun early and very tentative steps toward energy decentralization.
Higher energy prices relate to energy decentralization by making energy a more visible commodity. In the past, energy was of little interest to most people. Now with a growing recognition that high prices of energy are likely to become even higher in the future, with a widespread concern about the availability of energy supplies, and with a serious international threat to the well-being of the Nation arising from energy imports, almost everyone is thinking about energy. Until now, centralized decision-making has led to centralized "solutions" to the energy problems.
These solutions have not worked. Their failure has led to general acknow~ ledgement of our energy dilemmas. This awareness will, of necessity, lead millions of people to make individual dec~sions about their use of energy. This, in our view, is a prerequisite of energy decentralization.
The challenge is to make certain that these individual decision makers have access to the knowledge and the energy systems that can lead to more rational energy decisions.
B. The Role of the Federal Government in a Decentralized Energy Future
The federal government is the largest and most centralized organization in the United States. Energy decentralization implies countless decisions by the smallest groups and at the local level. How then do decentralized energy decision makers and a centralized governing body coexist under a decentralized energy strategy? Or can they reasonably coexist? 20 We believe there is no necessary incompatibility between big government and little energy systems. The appropriate scale,of a system, whether it is an organization or a technology, depends on numerous technical, economic, and social factors. Our stress on small-scale, decentralized energy systems derives from our sense that they are the ,best opportunities for our evolving energy system. It also stems from our sense that decentralizing important aspects of our decision-making process puts a large fraction of the responsibility to solve our energy problems where it belongs--on the individual. It does not, however, mean that big is bad, whether the "big" be government or technology. It does mean that we have gone much too far'with many of our big systems and have thus missed extraordinary opportunities for making good energy decisions.
The primary role of the federal government is as a means of encouraging decisions that are cost effective when viewed from a societal perspective. It is, in this sense, essential that the federal government provide appropriate incentives for the Nation to make investments in new ener~y systems that provide a large return on the investmeot.
This return needs to be measured in terms of economic benefits, improvements in the environment, and protectio~ from economic disruption. Such incentives themselves do not differentiate between the scale of technology.
However, under the present circumstances in which the decentralized energy solutions have been given little attention and the payoff from their use is so large, appropriate government incentives ought to make clear the advantages of many of the decentralized energy systems. In this view, the government needs particularly to recognize the pervasive barriers to improving energy efficiency and take measures to counteract the forces interfering with rational decision making.* A second role for the government, in our view, is a more active one of countering the powerful forces that impede our sense of rationality in energy decision making. The government is the only organization with sufficient size and authority to apply corrective measures to the marketplace when it fails to work properly. Thus, the use of energy efficiency standards can goad the market into responding as it should, if the standards ar~ set at a cost-effective level of energy efficiency.
And the standards, if applied intelligently, can spur a reluctant industry to make efficient products available. However, the standards are likely to be effective only if the population understands that they 21 save both money and energy, as well as reducing critical social problems.
And, for this understanding to become widespread, an enormous educational process is required.
Big industry is not likely to go away. Unfortunately, most of the political power exerted by the large energy industries is in favor of the large, conventional energy technologies that are, in our judgment, far less desirable than alternatives to them. (We do not expect the oil *Most of the barriers that interfere with good decision making on energy conservation apply as well to the decentralized uses of renewable energy resources. It is for this reason that we believe that an intensive effort to expand the use of efficient energy using devices will also in the longer tenn benefit small-scale renewable energy systems. This theme is worthy of considerable analysis, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
companies or the nuclear power industry to suddenly mount a massive lobbying campaign in favor of triple paned windows, R-48 attic insulation, or heat exchangers in houses.) To the extent that political power continues to influence the federal government to provide incentives for the wrong energy systems, we will see the government playa role antithetical to many energy needs of the Nation. To the extent that the government sees itself as playing a role in correcting imbalances in our energy system and recognizes that it can be an agent for positive change, the potential impact of government action in setting a context in which decentralized energy systems can reasonably compete with conventional systems is enormous.
C. Specific Policy Recommendations
We believe that a number of important policy measures are needed in order to translate the tentative beginnings in the direction of reduced energy use. decentralized energy technologies, and decentralized energy decision making. As stated above, we think that key centralized decisions by the federal government can work in concert with, and indeed encourage, decentralized energy decision making throughout the Nation. We discuss a few of these measures to illustrate the types of policy actions that can overcome or reduce to acceptable levels the energy problems discussed in this paper:
o Energy Efficiency Standards: The energy performance standards for consumer products (appliances, heating and cooling equipment) are important policy initiatives. The fact that some of them (residential buildings, some appliances) are based on economic criteria is highly desirable and has led to much tighter standards than would otherwise have been obtained. These standards are appropriate because of the extensive failures of the market place in these areas, as documented in this paper. However, the approach now taken is just a beginning. There 23 is a need to (1) make the remaining standards (e.g., commercial buildings, certain appliances) consistent with economic criteria, (2) provide strong incentives for industry to produce more efficient products that will meet much stricter standards (while still being economically sound investments), (3) extend the building standards from new buildings to existing buildings, where very large saving in dollars and energy are possible, and (4) ultimately base standards on marginal prices (the true cost of new energy supply), which is possible only when industry has responded to the need for products that are substantially more efficient in their energy use than at present.
o Pricing: We believe that marginal cost pricing, combined with effective and fair taxes on wlndfall proflts, is extremely desirable and will provide a significant boost to many decentralized energy systems. To be fair, the windfall profits tax should apply to all of the increased profits derived from the difference between average and marginal prices. We recognize, however, that marginal cost pricing, even with the difference in revenue between average and marginal prices of energy rebated to the American people, is not likely to be politically acceptable. A second best alternative is to base key energy policy decisions on marginal prices (e.g., conservation standards, incentives for new technologies that compete at the end user level against average prices when new supply competes against marginal prices). The government needs to make people aware of the rapid escallation in energy prices and the expectation of continued price rises. Even more importantly, the government needs to inform people how these prices can rationally influence their decision making on energy. Thus, even without marginal prices but with a serious educational campaign, many of the effects of marginal prices could be felt. o Institution building: No institutional mechanisms for economic tradeoff to be made between investment in energy supply and in increasing energy efficiency. As we have seen, the fact that the electric utility could evaluate only alternative supply options (thus excluding all demand moderating technologies) leads to an enormous squandering of valuable resources. This argues for an extension of the role of traditional energy supply companies into the markets spawned by energy demand technologies. Such an approach clearly requires new institutions or changes in old ones. The most striking example of such changes that are needed are the public utility commissions or public service commissions in each state. These commissions have great influence over all matters dealing with electricity. If their responsibility extended to matters dealing with the services provided by electricity, they could (under the proper framework) more effectively influence energy demand. This is but one example of numerous innovations that are needed to foster a more rational approach to decision making on energy. 25 
IV. CONCLUSION
We have presented views of the seemingly paradoxical nature and irrationality of the energy system and the decisions that determine its evolution. An economic approach to energy decisions~ while widely espoused and generally believed to be the underpinning of our system, appears not to be functioning in very important areas. The result is enormous waste of economic and intangible resources to produce energy that could be effectively replaced by energy conservation at low costs. This inefficiency in the economic system is, in our judgment, far greater than is recognized either by the public or by "experts." It has led to an over-investment in centralized energy systems and has discouraged the use of decentralized systems that could contribute significantly in the near term to a lessening of our energy problems. There are some signs that the situation is chang-, ing, albeit rather slowly. High prices and the widespread recognition of the seriousness of our energy problems have contributed to an increasing involvement of individuals in energy decisions profoundly affecting their future. To achieve an evolution of the energy system in which decentraliied technologi~s (and, in the near term, particularly technologies that improve the efficiency of energy use) play an important role, the government must act forcefully. This action needs to recognize and be responsive to the powerful discriminatory effect of the economic system, as it is presently constituted, against investments in en~rgy conservation.
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